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A B S T R A C T
Remanufacturing is a product recovery process that transforms a used product into “like-new” condition. It can
extend the useful life of a product and help in reducing waste caused by a huge amount of short life-cycle
products. Pricing decisions are an important aspect of successful remanufacturing and can secure the proﬁt-
ability of a ﬁrm. Remanufacturing for end-of-use products needs to cope with high uncertainties in terms of the
quality and quantity of the acquired product returns. Therefore, after inspection, only a fraction of returns can be
recovered through remanufacturing operations. This uncertainty in recovery yield inﬂuences the decisions im-
pacting acquisition, wholesale, and retail prices. We propose a pricing model that accommodates the random
yield eﬀect of product returns on pricing decisions for short life-cycle products in a closed-loop supply chain. The
system consists of a retailer, a manufacturer, and a collector of used-products. We apply a sequential decision
approach to determine the optimum pricing decision to maximize supply chain proﬁt, according to a pricing
game that places the manufacturer as a Stackelberg leader. We demonstrate the eﬀect of changing parameter
values on the wholesale and retail prices as well as on the proﬁtability. The results indicate that the proﬁtability
of each player and the supply chain as a whole is aﬀected by the quality of the collected used products, the
acquisition price, the shortage penalty, and the remanufacturing costs. Interestingly, reducing variance of
random yield results in lower proﬁt for the collector even though the other players and the whole supply chain
are better oﬀ.
1. Introduction
Due to recent developments, product life cycles have been becoming
shorter and shorter, especially for technology-based products. Coupled
with an increasing obsolescence in function and desirability, short life
cycle products have created a huge amount of waste. Remanufacturing
is a product recovery process that transforms used products into “like-
new” condition. It can extend a product's useful life and help in redu-
cing waste. There are three motives for remanufacturing that are often
cited in the literature: ethical and moral responsibility, regulation, and
proﬁtability [1]. The ﬁrst motive is relatively weak compared with the
others, a fact that was originally noted by Ferrer and Guide [2]. The
second motive relies on government regulation, which may not apply to
some countries or states. The importance of proﬁtability, however, is
supported by several studies [3–6]. There are three key activities in the
reverse supply chain, as noted by Guide and Wassenhove [7]. They
include the management of product return, issues in remanufacturing
operations, and issues in remarketing the remanufactured product.
Furthermore, these researchers ﬁnd that the business perspective, in-
cluding pricing, which is part of the market development activity, is an
area that needs to be explored further.
The pricing decision is an important aspect of a successful re-
manufacturing project and can secure the proﬁtability of a ﬁrm. Atasu
et al. [8] ﬁnd that cannibalization towards new products is not always
occurred when remanufactured product is presented. Managers who
understand the composition of their markets and use a proper pricing
strategy should be able to create additional proﬁt. In a similar manner,
Souza [9] notes that there are two implications when manufacturer
oﬀers remanufactured product alongside new product i.e. a market
expansion eﬀect or a cannibalization eﬀect; hence making the pricing of
the two products a critical issue. Therefore, pricing decision is very
important in achieving economic advantages from remanufacturing
practices.
To sustain the remanufacturing activity, not only the price should be
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orp.2018.07.002
Received 7 October 2017; Received in revised form 3 June 2018; Accepted 6 July 2018
⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: gshusan@peter.petra.ac.id (S.-S. Gan), suparno@ie.its.ac.id (Suparno), b_widodo@matematika.its.ac.id (B. Widodo).
Operations Research Perspectives 5 (2018) 174–190
2214-7160/ © 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY/4.0/).
T
right to ensure that the demand is large enough, but also the inputs for
the remanufacturing process should be available with suﬃcient quan-
tity, at acceptable quality, and in an appropriate time. However, unlike
the remanufacturing of consumer and business-to-business (B2B) re-
turns, the remanufacturing of end-of-use products needs to cope with
high uncertainties in terms of the quality, quantity, and timing of the
acquired product returns. After the collected used products are in-
spected, only a fraction of the returns can be used in a remanufacturing
operation. If the collected returns are insuﬃcient or their quality is low,
the remanufacturing activity maybe below the economies of scale and
leaving signiﬁcant remanufacturing capacity idle.
There has been discussion on how quality of collected returns may
aﬀect the performance of ﬁrms in a closed-loop supply chain. As an
example, Ford's attempt to enter the automotive recycling industry via
Greenleaf LLC resulted in failure due to problems in the quality of the
collected returns. A manager at Ford, James L. Richardson, stated that
the value of the materials they bought was lower than the value for
which they actually paid [10]. Higher quality returns can reduce re-
manufacturing cost, consume less production capacity and have higher
salvage value [9]. Random yield of product returns also inﬂuences the
decisions in acquisition price and selling price [10]. It is not quite ob-
vious however, how the quality of collected returns aﬀect the behavior
of closed-loop supply chain players in a more complex problem setting,
especially when more parties are involved and the products handled are
short life in nature.
This paper accommodates the eﬀect of the random recovery yield of
product returns on pricing decisions for short life-cycle products in a
closed-loop supply chain. We consider a closed-loop supply chain that
consists of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a collector in a pricing game
under Stackelberg leadership with manufacturer as the leader. The
collector obtains used products (cores) from the customers and then
sells them to the manufacturer with a certain transfer price. A random
recovery yield variable is introduced, which represents the fraction of
returns that are remanufacturable. Cores not acceptable for re-
manufacturing would be sold by the collector to another party with a
certain salvage value. We also introduce a shortage penalty as an at-
tempt to entice the collector to obtain suﬃcient recoverable returns.
Thus, when making decisions on the quantity of cores to be collected,
the collector needs to consider the transfer price, the recovery yield
parameters, the shortage penalty, as well as the salvage value. The
purpose of this study is to determine the optimum wholesale price,
retail price, and acquisition price and the relevant order or production
quantities so that the supply chain's proﬁts can be maximized. In ad-
dition we also aim to explore how the change in parameter values aﬀect
the decisions along the supply chain and how these decisions subse-
quently aﬀect their proﬁtability.
2. Literature review
The importance of pricing strategy in a closed-loop supply chain
that concerns remanufacturing has been previously explored in several
studies [7,8,11]. The results from these studies received positive re-
sponses, which can be ascertained through the ever-increasing number
of studies on pricing decisions in remanufacturing practices, whether
from the perspective of one member or several key members in the
supply chain.
There are numerous studies on pricing remanufactured products for
proﬁt maximization. For instance, the studies by Ferrer and
Swaminathan [12], Atasu et al. [5], and Ovchinnikov [13]. Gan et al.
[14] search for the optimal price and quantity under a deterministic
setting, focus on pricing decisions in a closed-loop supply chain invol-
ving manufacturer, retailer and collector of used products (cores). They
consider a monopolist of a single item with no constraint on the
quantity of remanufacturable cores throughout the selling horizon.
Demand functions are deterministic and linear in price; and they re-
present the short life-cycle patterns along the entire phases of product
life-cycle. The objective of the proposed model is to ﬁnd the optimal
wholesale and retail prices for both new and remanufactured products;
and the optimal acquisition and transfer prices. Recently, Gan et al.
[15] propose a pricing decision model for a closed-loop supply chain
involving manufacturer, retailer, and collector, where the re-
manufactured products are sold via separate sales channel. Further-
more, a problem in pricing and warranty level decisions for new and
remanufactured products are also studied [16]. However, the above-
mentioned studies have not yet considered uncertainty in the recovery-
yield while the returned cores are not always economically or techni-
cally feasible to remanufacture. Furthermore, they have not considered
random demand, while the product life-cycle is short with an ob-
solescence eﬀect that would increase the demand's uncertainty.
In many cases, remanufacturing is performed by the manufacturer,
and so a hybrid system is applied. Pricing models in this setting have
been discussed by several authors. Ferrer and Swaminathan [12] study
a problem where a manufacturer produces new products during the ﬁrst
period and oﬀers both new and remanufactured products during sub-
sequent periods by utilizing the returned number of used products. The
new and remanufactured products are not diﬀerentiated but rather are
sold in the same market at the same price. Moreover, the proposed
models are developed for 2-periods monopoly and duopoly, more than
two periods, and the inﬁnite planning horizon. The models aim to ﬁnd
the optimum quantities and prices of new and remanufactured products
that will maximize proﬁt. Extending their work, Ferrer and Swami-
nathan [17] propose a similar scenario, but they diﬀerentiated between
the prices of new and remanufactured products. Atasu et al. [5] re-
cognize three drivers from demand-related aspects which are com-
peting with the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) directly,
having green segment as a the potential market from, and utilizing the
speed of market growth. The results conﬁrmed that these three factors
have strong interactions and signiﬁcant impacts on remanufacturing
decisions. Furthermore, they manage to show that remanufacturing can
be an eﬀective marketing strategy and not merely a cost-saving strategy
or an approach to achieving compliance with environmental regula-
tions. In the competition with an OEM's strong brand image, the ana-
lysis shows that a remanufacturing strategy could draw more custo-
mers. Ovchinnikov [13] proposes a model for ﬁnding the optimal
proﬁt-maximizing prices and quantities of remanufactured products
when both new and remanufactured product are sold side by side.
Customer switching behavior was also studied to understand their
choices behind buying new or remanufactured products and to identify
how large is the fraction of customers who switch from buying new
products to remanufactured ones. Shi et al. [18] propose a model to
determine the price and quantities of new and remanufactured product,
and the used products’ acquisition price, which would maximize the
total proﬁt of the supply chain. In this model, the price of re-
manufactured products is not diﬀerentiated from new products, and
both are sold in the same market. Furthermore, demand and return are
both stochastic and price-sensitive. The analysis shows that for a small
market size, the optimal strategy is pure remanufacturing. However, for
a large market, the best strategy is mixed manufacturing/re-
manufacturing. The eﬀect of demand uncertainty signiﬁcantly impacts
the production plan and the selling price of new products. Instead, the
uncertainty of return aﬀects not only the remanufacturing plan but also
the manufacturing plan of new products. Chen and Chang [19] develop
a dynamic pricing model for new and remanufactured products under a
constrained supply of used products. The model is developed with a
static environment as the benchmark and a two-period and multi-period
setting over the product life cycle, to determine the optimum prices for
maximizing proﬁt. Although the products are diﬀerentiated, they are
partially substitutable. Another study by Xiong et al. [20] takes into
account the lost sales and uncertain quality of used products in devel-
oping a pricing model for core product acquisition for remanufacturing
companies. In this model, the demand is stochastic and the objective of
the model is cost minimization over ﬁnite and inﬁnite horizons.
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Several studies on pricing decisions from the remanufacturer's
point-of-view are mainly focused on the selling price of remanufactured
products and the optimal acquisition price of used products [3,10,21],
in which the remanufacturer performs both collection and re-
manufacturing processes. Guide et al. [3] claim that product recovery
management is the primary driver determining the proﬁtability of reuse
activities. They develop a model to ﬁnd the optimal selling prices of
remanufactured products and the acquisition prices for each quality
class of returns, which together maximize the manufacturer's proﬁt.
Liang et al. [22] address the problem of collecting used products when
there is a random ﬂuctuation in remanufactured products’ prices, given
the condition that the remanufacturer is required to oﬀer a certain core
price to motivate customers to return the used products. The re-
manufactured products price is presumed to follow the Geometric
Brownian Motion. A model is then developed to evaluate the acquisi-
tion price of used products. Moreover, they use option principles to
further determine the selling price of the remanufactures products.
Remanufactured products’ prices vary according to market sentiment,
thus exhibiting the nature of stocks; hence, the core price shows the
characteristics of the options. Other studies, rather than focusing on the
eﬀect of acquisition price on the quantity and quality of product re-
turns, focus on the eﬀect of random yield. For example, Bakal and
Akcali [10] develop a pricing model to determine the acquisition and
selling prices that maximize proﬁt when the supply of used products
and the demand for remanufactured parts are deterministic and price-
sensitive. They also investigated the eﬀect of random yield by setting
diﬀerent timings for price decisions. The recovery yield refers to the
fraction of parts that are remanufacturable, and it can be inﬂuenced by
used products’ acquisition price. The ﬁrst setting takes the selling price
decision after the recovery yield is calculated, and the second setting
takes the pricing decision prior to the determination of the recovery
yield. Hence, this model simultaneously determines the acquisition and
selling prices. Later, Li et al. [21] not only consider the eﬀect of random
yield but also random demand. They proposed an optimization model
using two-step stochastic dynamic programming. First, they found the
optimal selling price to maximize expected revenue and then calculated
the collection price that maximizes the utility of the ﬁrm. This study is
further extended in Li et al. [23], and they study two sequential deci-
sion strategies i.e. First-Remanufacturing-Then-Pricing (FRTP) and
First-Pricing-Then-Remanufacturing (FPTR). Therefore, these optimi-
zation models attempt to conclude not only the remanufactured pro-
duct's optimal selling price but also the remanufacturing quantity under
conditions of random yield and random demand.
There are several approaches used in the literature that addresses
random yield. Zikopoulos and Tagaras [24] study the impact of un-
certainty in the quality of product returns when a manufacturer oper-
ates a single-period refurbishing process, and propose a unique solution
for optimal expected proﬁt. Mukhopadhyay and Ma [25] study the ef-
fect of random yield rates by comparing three cases: the deterministic
yield rate and the random yield rate with the order placed both before
and after the actual yield is observed. Ferguson et al. [26] propose the
use of a grading system to tackle uncertainty in return quantity and
uncertainty in the demand for remanufactured products. They develop
a model with capacitated remanufacturing facilities for re-
manufacturing when returns have various quality levels. In Roy et al.
[27], the material for remanufacturing process is fed by the defective
units from the production system, the rate of defectiveness is uncertain,
and is approximated by a constant or fuzzy parameter. Teunter and
Flapper [28] consider multiple quality classes and multinomial quality
distribution for acquired lots and ﬁnd that it is necessary to obtain
additional used products as safety stock to avoid cost errors. Robotis
et al. [29] consider the random quality of returns as the source of un-
certainty in remanufacturing costs and propose an inspection environ-
ment setting based on the ﬁrm's ability to perform a reliable inspection
of used products. Wang et al. [30] study a hybrid manufacturing re-
manufacturing system for a short life-cycle product with stochastic
demand and stochastic returned products to get a minimum total cost
for the hybrid system. Li et al. [31] propose a hybrid manufacturing
remanufacturing model with market-driven acquisition channel and a
random remanufacturing yield. They develop two models i.e. sequential
and parallel manufacturing/remanufacturing. The analysis of double
marginalization eﬀect in decentralized supply chain with uncertain
supply is also studied by Li et al. [32]. Another acquisition problem is
also addressed by Li et al. [33] where they show that ordering more
than what is needed is not always optimal. Then they propose a con-
dition under which this strategy becomes optimal. Qiang et al. [34]
provide a ﬁnite dimensional variational inequality problem as the
governing equilibrium condition in the existence of stochastic demand
and a returns yield rate. Ahiska and Kurtul [35] study a stochastic
hybrid manufacturing/ remanufacturing system with substitution using
a discrete-time Markov Decision process, with stochastic demand and
returns. A product substitution strategy and its proﬁtability are studied,
and it can be shown that proﬁtability is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the
remanufactured-product price to manufacturing cost ratio. Li et al. [36]
consider an acquisition problem where the quality of product return is
uncertain, and the market demand is also stochastic. They study several
sorting strategies in remanufacturing-to-stock (RMTS) and re-
manufacturing-to-order (RMTO) systems. They ﬁnd that sorting is
useless in an RMTS system but useful in RMTO system.
The pricing models within a supply chain that involve several
members of the supply chain were also discussed in several studies.
Qiaolun et al. [37] consider a supply chain that consists of a manu-
facturer, a retailer, and a collector. These companies are involved in
selling new products, collecting used core products, remanufacturing,
and reselling the recovered products. The manufacturer is the Stackel-
berg leader, and he determines the wholesale price, whereas the retailer
and collector decide on the retail price and the acquisition price of the
used products. The return rate is inﬂuenced by end-customer's will-
ingness, and willingness is aﬀected by the collecting price. Wei and
Zhao [38] consider fuzziness in customer demands, remanufacturing
costs, and collecting costs in a closed-loop supply chain and use fuzzy
theory and game theory to ﬁnd the optimal retail price, wholesale price,
and remanufacturing rate. There are two scenarios considered, namely,
centralized and decentralized decision scenarios. Wu [39] uses game
theory to investigate the OEM's product design strategy and the re-
manufacturer's pricing strategy. The OEM has to consider the level of
interchangeability in its product design and needs to ﬁnd the optimal
level because increasing the level of interchangeability would decrease
the OEM's manufacturing cost and the remanufacturer's cost in the at-
tempt to cannibalize the OEM's product. The remanufacturer evaluates
its pricing strategy and decides on either low or high pricing. In this
model, the demands for new and remanufactured products are both
linear and sensitive to price. Wu [40], similar to Wu [39], applies game
theory to compute equilibrium decisions when determining the prices
of new and remanufactured products and the degree of the dis-
assemblability of the OEM's product design. The OEM risks price
competition with the remanufacturer because when the degree of dis-
assemblability is high, it not only reduces the OEM's production cost but
also reduces the remanufacturer's recovery cost. The model is con-
structed for two-period and multi-period problems. Moreover, the de-
mands for new and remanufactured products are both linear and price-
sensitive. However, the above studies consider only deterministic or
fuzzy demand and do not consider randomness in the demand function.
Jena and Sarmah [41] study optimal acquisition price management in a
remanufacturing system, considering three schemes of collection: di-
rect, indirect, and coordinated. The model involves a remanufacturer
and a retailer and aims to determine the optimum core price that
maximizes proﬁt within a single period. This study considers random
demand, but only for the remanufactured product. It is our goal to study
pricing decisions with random demand for both new and re-
manufactured products within a closed-loop supply chain.
Our study focuses on the random recovery yield and random
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demands, and we consider all of the key members of the closed-loop
supply chain: the manufacturer, the retailer, and the collector.
Therefore, we consider both new and remanufactured products and the
pricing decisions made by the above-mentioned members. A sequential
decision approach is used in this study to calculate the optimal prices.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 3, we provide a
description of the problem, which includes the process ﬂow, the vari-
ables involved, the demand pattern, the deﬁnitions of multiple func-
tions, and the decision ﬂows. The development of optimization models
for each of the three key members in the closed-loop supply chain is
discussed in Section 4. In Section 5, we provide numerical examples and
discuss several important factors in the pricing decisions. Finally, our
conclusions are presented in Section 6.
3. Problem description
As depicted in Fig. 1, we consider a closed-loop supply chain that
consists of three members: a manufacturer, a retailer, and a collector.
The closed-loop system is initiated by the production of new product,
which is sold at a wholesale price Pnw to the retailer according to the
quantity qn ordered. The new product is then released on the market at
a retail price Pn. After a certain period of time, some products reach
their end-of-use and become the objects of used products collection.
The used product is acquired by the collector at a certain acquisition
price Pc and in a quantity of qc. The collector performs inspection,
sorting, and cleaning tasks under a random recovery yield γ. The por-
tions of the collected products that are remanufacturable are then
transferred to the manufacturer at a price Pf as the inputs for the re-
manufacturing process. The quantity of remanufactured products made
by the manufacturer is dependent on the retailer's original order
quantity ( qn) and the availability of the remanufacturable items. The
remanufactured product is then sold to the retailer at a wholesale
price Prw and released on the market at a retail price Pr.
The product considered in this model is a single short life-cycle item
with an obsolescence eﬀect after a certain period, in terms of ob-
solescence in function and desirability. The demands are random with
four time frames that represent the short life-cycle pattern; this is true
for both new and remanufactured products, and they have linear prices.
The product is a short life-cycle product where the useful life is typi-
cally less than 2 years [42]. For these products, a single period is
considered reasonable, since the future demand is not guaranteed [43].
Following the assumption in Atasu et al. [5] and Deng and Yang [44],
we assume that the manufacturer declares the price of new product at
the beginning of the selling horizon, and does not consider price ad-
justment when the remanufactured product becomes available. Also,
since customers already aware of the price of new product, it is ne-
cessary to price the remanufactured product lower than the new pro-
duct, as an attempt to make remanufactured product attractive to the
customers.
As depicted in Fig. 2, there are four time-frames considered in this
model. The ﬁrst time frame [0, t1] only oﬀers new product on the
market, while the second and third time frames, [t1, μ] and [μ, t3], oﬀer
new and remanufactured products. Both new and remanufactured
products are in increasing phase during the second time frame, but are
in opposite directions during the third. In the fourth time frame [t3, T],
new product is no longer manufactured, and remanufactured produce is
entering its decline phase. The demand pattern over those time frames
are constructed for both the new and the remanufactured product, and
the governing functions as in [14] i.e.
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where dn(t) and dr(t) are the demand patterns for the new and the re-
manufactured products. U is maximum possible demand for the new
product, μ is the time of highest demand, λ is the speed of the change in
demand. Parallel deﬁnitions are applicable for V, t3, dr0, and η, re-
spectively, for the remanufactured product.
As the demands for the new and the remanufactured products are
random and both depend on the price of the new product and the price
of the remanufactured product, the demand functions can be expressed
as:
= − +D P P t d t aP bP α( , , ) ( )(1 )·n n r n n r (3.3)
= − +D P P t d t cP dP β( , , ) ( )(1 )·r n r r r n (3.4)
where α and β are random variables with density functions f(x) and g
(x), respectively, and cumulative distribution functions F(x) and G(x),
respectively. The random variable can take an additive form, as in
Petruzzi and Dada [45], Shi et al. [18], and Jena and Sarmah [41], or
multiplicative forms, as in Li et al. [21], Cai et al. [46], and Li et al.
[23]. In this study, we use a multiplicative form because the random
variable is a non-negative number (as opposed to a real, zero-mean,
random variable in the additive form). Furthermore, the random term
in a multiplicative form only aﬀects the magnitude of the demand, not
the price elasticity of the demand.
The demand function information is shared to and by all members of
the supply chain. The pricing game mechanism begins with the man-
ufacturer, as the Stackelberg leader, releasing the wholesale prices. This
information is used by the retailer, along with an observation of the
market demand, in deciding optimal retail prices and product order
quantities. Similarly, the collector observes the market demand for the
remanufactured product and decides on the optimal acquisition price,
taking into consideration the random recovery yield. The re-
manufacturable-acquired products are then transferred to the manu-
facturer, who (re)calculates the wholesale prices for both the new and
remanufactured products.
List of notations
Decision variables
All variables are non-negative.
Pn : retail price of the new product;
Pr : price of the remanufactured product; Pr≤ Pn
Pnw : wholesale price of the new product; Pnw≤ Pn
Prw : wholesale price of the new product; Prw≤ Pr
Pc : collection or acquisition price; Pc≤ Pf
Fig. 1. Framework of the closed-loop pricing model with a
random yield.
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Parameters:
All parameters are non-negative.
Pf : collector to remanufacturer transfer price for the re-
manufacturable core product
qn : retailer's order quantity for the new product
qr : retailer's order quantity for the remanufactured product
qc : collection quantity
d12 : demand potential of the new product, excluding price sen-
sitivity
d34 : demand potential of the remanufactured product, excluding
price sensitivity
a : new product's price sensitivity, i.e., the sensitivity of the
demand for the new product to a change in the price of the
new product
b : remanufactured product's cross-price sensitivity, i.e., the
sensitivity of the demand for the new product to a change in
the price of the remanufactured product
c : remanufactured product's price sensitivity, i.e., the sensi-
tivity of the demand for the remanufactured product to a
change in the price of the remanufactured product
e : new product's cross-price sensitivity, i.e., the sensitivity of
the demand for the remanufactured product to a change in
the price of the new product
α : random variable as the multiplicative uncertainty of the
demand for the new product; α∈ [0, 1]
β : random variable as the multiplicative uncertainty of the
demand for the remanufactured product; β∈ [0, 1]
γ : random yield of the product's return; γ∈ [0, 1]
nc : unit shortage penalty applied to the collector by the man-
ufacturer
nm : unit shortage penalty applied to the manufacturer by the
retailer
v : unit salvage value
crw : unit raw material cost of producing the new product
cm : unit manufacturing cost of producing the new product
cr : unit remanufacturing cost of producing and selling the re-
manufactured product
co : unit collection cost
φ : coeﬃcient in the return rate function
θ : exponent of the power function in the return rate function,
which determines the curve's steepness; θ∈ [0, 1]
4. Optimization
The optimization model uses a sequential decision-making approach
under the condition of a Stackelberg game, with the manufacturer as
the leader. The objective of the pricing model is to maximize the proﬁts
of all of the key players through the payment ﬂows, shown in Fig. 3.
4.1. Retailer's optimization
The retailer's pricing decision is very important because the de-
mands are random and price-sensitive, which applies to the prices of
both the new product and the remanufactured product. Hence, in our
proposed model, the retail prices, together with the demand's random
variables, are the determinants of the quantity of demand. As the
Stackelberg leader, the manufacturer makes the ﬁrst move in the game
by releasing the initial wholesale prices Pnw and Prw. The retailer then
optimizes its retail prices through a sequential approach, as presented
in (4.1) and (4.2).
First, the retailer computes the optimum quantities of new and re-
manufactured products (qn, qr) that maximize its proﬁt under the con-
ditions of random demand for each product, given the predetermined
retail prices, (Pn, Pr). Then, the optimum quantities are utilized to cal-
culate the optimal retail prices.
As the demands for the new and remanufactured products are
random and price-sensitive, the retailer's pricing decision signiﬁcantly
impacts the respective price of each product. Furthermore, the retail
prices of both products will determine the size of the demands. The
retailer optimizes its retail prices using a sequential approach, as shown
in (4.1) and (4.2). First, the retailer calculates the optimum quantities
of new and remanufactured products (qn, qr) that maximize its proﬁt
under the conditions of random demand for each product, given the
predetermined retail prices (Pn, Pr). Then, the optimum quantities are
utilized to determine the optimal retail prices.
= − + −P P q q q P P q P POptim 1: maxΠ (( , ) ( * , * )) * ( ) * ( )
P P
R n r Rn Rr Rn n nw Rr r rw,n r
(4.1)
where q q( * , * )Rn Rr is the solution of Optim 2
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where In(α) is the total demand over [0, t3] for the new product, which
is a function of the random variable α, and Ir(β) is the total demand over
[t1,T] for the remanufactured product, which is a function of the
random variable β.
Therefore,
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Fig. 2. Demand pattern for a product with a gradual obsolescence over time.
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Proposition 1. The retailer's expected order quantities for new and
remanufactured products to maximize its proﬁt (4.2) under the given
(retail) prices Pn and Pr are:
⎜ ⎟= − + ⎛⎝
⎞
⎠
−q d aP bP F P
P
* (1 )Rn n r
nw
n
12
1
(4.7)
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⎠
−q d cP eP G P
P
* (1 )Rr r n
rw
r
34
1
(4.8)
Proposition 2. The optimal retail prices that maximize the retailer's
proﬁt (4.1) on the order quantities of q*Rn and q*Rr are P*n and P*r , which
satisﬁes the nonlinear system:
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where = − +u d aP bP(1 )n r12 , and = − +l d cP eP(1 )r n34 ; = −x F xΦ( ) ( )1
and = −x G xΨ( ) ( )1 ; and ′ = −x F xΦ ( ) ( ( ))ddx 1 and ′ = −x G xΨ ( ) ( ( ))ddx 1 .
The optimal retail prices P*n and P*r are inﬂuenced by the price
elasticity of demand, and the uncertainty of the respective demands for
both the new and remanufactured products. However, when ascer-
taining the optimal retail prices, it is diﬃcult to provide closed-form
solutions. Thus, we utilize a computational approach and leave the
analysis to the numerical study.
4.2. Collector's optimization
The collector's problem is signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the random
recovery yield, as only a portion (γ) of the returned used products meets
the input requirements of the remanufacturing process. In our model,
the quantity of returns qc is inﬂuenced by the acquisition price Pc; an
approach that has been used in several previous studies, including
Qiaolun et al. [37], Li et al. [21] and El Saadany and Jaber [47]. The
collector inspects and sorts the acquired returns and then transfers the
remanufacturable items to the manufacturer at a transfer price of Pf.
Returns that do not meet the quality requirement are discarded.
Because the collector determines the collected quantity of re-
manufacturable items before the random recovery yield is realized, the
actual quantity of remanufacturable items may be higher or lower than
the manufacturer's order quantity qr. Therefore, a shortage penalty nc
and a salvage value v are incorporated in the model. The recovery yield
γ is a random variable with the density function h(x) and the cumula-
tive distribution functionH(x).
The governing equation for the collection quantity, as a function of
the acquisition price, is given as:
= =q P φP qΘ( ) ,c c cθ n (4.11)
which is similar to the return rate used in [37], where φ is a positive,
constant coeﬃcient, and θ ∈[0,1] is the exponent of the power func-
tion, which determines the curve's steepness.
Therefore, the collector's optimization problem can be expressed as:
= − −
+ − − +
+
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Optim 3: maxΠ ( ) · [min( , ) [ ]
[ ] ] ( )
q
C c f γ r c c r c
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Proposition 3. The optimal collection quantity for the collector's
optimization problem (4.18) is q*c , which satisﬁes:
∫ ⎜ ⎟+ − + − ⎛⎝ + ⎞⎠⎛⎝ ⎞⎠ − =P n v x h x dx v E γ θ
q
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and the optimal collection price is = ( )P *c qφq θ* 1/c n
The optimal collection quantity and price depends on the recovery
yield's randomness, the parameters of the collection function, the order
quantity of the remanufactured product, and the transfer price, as well
as the shortage penalty and the salvage value (if applicable). Because a
closed-form solution is diﬃcult to obtain, we use a numerical study to
analyze the eﬀects of parameters, such as the yield's randomness.
4.3. Manufacturer’ optimization
The manufacturer tracks the pricing and quantity policies set by the
retailer, as well as the quantity of remanufacturable items supplied by
the collector, after the random recovery yield has been realized.
Therefore, the manufacturer is not necessarily always able to supply the
retailer's order quantities of the remanufactured product because the
ability of the manufacturer to meet the retailer's order-quantity is de-
pendent on the ability of the collector to meet the quantity require-
ments. Consequently, a shortage penalty may be imposed on the
Fig. 3. Flow of payments in the closed-loop supply chain.
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manufacturer by the retailer to increase the level of order fulﬁllment.
Being the Stackelberg leader with full information about the followers’
strategy, manufacturer maximize her proﬁt by considering retailer's and
collector's reaction as given in (4.9), (4.10), and (4.13). Thus, the
manufacturer's optimization problem is expressed as:
= − −
+ − −
− − +
q P c c
E q q γ P P c
n q q γ
Optim 4: max Π ( )
[min( , )·( )
[ ] ]
P P
M n nw rw m
γ r c rw f r
m r c
,nw rw
(4.14)
subject to (4.9), (4.10), and (4.13)where crw and cm are the unit raw
material cost and the unit manufacturing cost, respectively, for the new
product, whereas cr is the remanufacturing cost and nm is the unit
shortage penalty. The optimum wholesale prices, Pnw* and Prw*, de-
pends on the cost structures, demands’ parameters and randomness,
yield's randomness, and collection's parameters; which is the attain-
ment of manufacturer's complete information. We use a computational
method to ﬁnd the optimum wholesale prices, and a numerical ap-
proach to study the eﬀects of several important factors, such as re-
manufacturing cost and unit shortage penalty.
4.4. Optimization with uniform distribution
We use a uniform distribution for the random variables in the de-
mand functions and the recovery yield. This type of distribution is
previously applied in Li et al. [23] and Mukhopadhyay and Ma [25].
Furthermore, α, β, and γ are random variables with a uniform dis-
tribution that have ﬁnite support [0,1]. The best responses of each
player can be shown in the following propositions.
Proposition 4. Let demand of new product be uniformly distributed in
[A1, B1] within ﬁnite support [0, 1], demand of remanufactured
product be uniformly distributed in [A2, B2] within ﬁnite support [0,
1], the retailer's best responses for the optimization problem (4.1) are:
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This explains that the retailer's best responses are aﬀected by the
wholesale prices, the variance of new product as well as re-
manufactured products’ variance, and the demand potential.
Proposition 5. Let the yield factor be uniformly distributed in [A3, B3]
within ﬁnite support [0, 1]. The collector's best response for the
optimization problem (4.18) is:
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This proposition suggests that the collector's best response is af-
fected by shortage penalty, salvage value, transfer price, mean and
variance of random yield, and the return rate function. It is also in-
ﬂuenced by the variability in demands, both new and remanufactured
products.
Proposition 6. The manufacturer's best responses for the proﬁt
maximization problem (4.14) with uniformly distributed demands
and yield factors are:
− + + + − =aP bP P c c P(1 )( 2 ) 0n r n rw m nw (4.20)
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Thus, the manufacturer's best response for new product's price is
aﬀected by manufacturing and material costs, as well as price sensi-
tivity. As for the remanufactured product, it is aﬀected by the varia-
bility in remanufactured product's demand, price sensitivity, transfer
price, shortage penalty, and demand potential.
Furthermore, we could express the problem as a constrained opti-
mization problem:
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subject to: =R P P P P( , , , ) 0nw rw n r1 ; i.e. Eq. (4.17)
=R P P P P( , , , ) 0nw rw n r2 ; i.e. Eq. (4.18)
=C P P P P q( , , , , ) 0nw rw n r c1 ; i.e. Eq. (4.19)
The Lagrangian function is:
= + + +L P P P P q λ R λ R λ CMax ( , , , , ) Πnw rw n r c M 1 1 2 2 3 1
Assuming that ∇R1, ∇R2, and ∇C are linearly independent, and that
=R P P( , ) 0n r1 , =R P P( , ) 0n r2 , and =C P P q( , , ) 0n r c1 intersect, then the
critical points can be found [48].
5. Numerical example
The price sensitiveness of the demands for new and remanufactured
products are given as = =a b0.003, 0.0001,
= =c e0.004, and 0.0002. The demand capacity of the new product
contains the parameters U, d0, and λ, such that =d 400012 , whereas the
demand capacity of the remanufactured product involves the para-
meters V, dr0, and η, such that =d 150034 . The unit raw material cost for
the new product is =c 50rw ; the unit manufacturing cost is =c 40m ; the
unit remanufacturing cost is =c 20r ; and the unit collecting cost is
=c 40 . The parameters of the return rate function are =φ 0.1 and
=θ 0.7. The collector's shortage penalty and salvage value are =n 5c
and =v 8, respectively, whereas the manufacturer's shortage penalty is
=n 50m . The transfer price is =P 40f .
The optimization problems are solved using Matlab. We performed
sensitivity analyses for several factors that are important for the pricing
decision, namely, the unit remanufacturing cost, the manufacturer's
shortage penalty, and the parameters of the random yield. The results
are shown in Tables 1–7. We plot the proﬁt functions over the domain
of the decision variables, which can be seen in Figs. 4, 5, and 6 for the
retailer's, the collector's, and the manufacturer's proﬁt functions, re-
spectively.
Table 1 shows that an increase in the remanufacturing cost will
lower the proﬁts of the retailer, the manufacturer, and the collector.
The corresponding graph is presented in Fig. 7. As the remanufacturing
cost increases, the manufacturer responds by increasing the wholesale
price of the remanufactured product and decreasing the quantity pro-
duced. Therefore, both the retailer and the manufacturer receive lower
proﬁts, but the retailer's proﬁt decreases faster than the manufacturer's.
Similarly, as shown in Table 2, when the manufacturer's shortage
penalty increases, the retailer's, the manufacturer's, and the collector's
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Table 1
Eﬀects of changes to the remanufacturing cost.
cr
30 20 10 5
Wholesale price of new product
(Pnw)
167.24 166.06 164.88 164.29
Retail price of new product (Pn) 274.87 274.34 273.80 273.53
Quantity of new product (qn) 309.89 314.80 319.79 322.31
Wholesale price of
remanufactured product
(Prw)
150.51 149.45 148.39 147.86
Retail price of remanufactured
product (Pr)
224.53 224.08 223.63 223.40
Quantity of remanufactured
product (qr)
46.12 47.03 47.95 48.42
Acquisition price of used
product (Pc)
5.01 5.03 5.05 5.06
Quantity of used product
collected (qc)
95.68 97.49 99.34 100.27
Manufacturer's proﬁt (ΠM) 26,076.61 26,542.36 27,017.26 27,258.19
Retailer's proﬁt (ΠR) 36,767.91 37,594.91 38,438.82 38,867.23
Collector's proﬁt (ΠC) 585.70 595.13 604.68 609.51
Total system's proﬁt (ΠT) 63,430.21 64,732.40 66,060.77 66,734.93
Table 2
Eﬀects of changes to the manufacturer's shortage penalty.
nm
70 50 30 10
Wholesale price of new product
(Pnw)
167.96 166.06 164.13 162.17
Retail price of new product (Pn) 275.20 274.34 273.46 272.56
Quantity of new product (qn) 306.89 314.80 322.98 331.42
Wholesale price of
remanufactured product
(Prw)
151.17 149.45 147.72 145.95
Retail price of remanufactured
product (Pr)
224.81 224.08 223.34 222.58
Quantity of remanufactured
product (qr)
45.57 47.03 48.54 50.11
Acquisition price of used
product (Pc)
4.99 5.03 5.06 5.10
Quantity of used product
collected (qc)
94.57 97.49 100.52 103.65
Manufacturer's proﬁt (ΠM) 25,910.87 26,542.36 27,198.01 27,878.77
Retailer's proﬁt (ΠR) 36,265.01 37,594.91 38,981.05 40,425.88
Collector's proﬁt (ΠC) 579.93 595.13 610.79 626.92
Total system's proﬁt (ΠT) 62,755.81 64,732.40 66,789.85 68,931.56
Table 3
Eﬀects of changes to the mean value of the random yield.
γ∼U[A, B]
U[0.1,0.7] U[0.2,0.8] U[0.3,0.9]
Mean 0.40 0.50 0.60
Wholesale price of new product (Pnw) 164.75 164.62 164.50
Retail price of new product (Pn) 273.74 273.68 273.63
Quantity of new product (qn) 320.34 320.87 321.40
Wholesale price of remanufactured
product (Prw)
148.27 148.16 148.05
Retail price of remanufactured product
(Pr)
223.58 223.53 223.48
Quantity of remanufactured product (qr) 81.06 81.24 81.41
Acquisition price of used product (Pc) 6.11 6.25 6.39
Quantity of used product collected (qc) 113.78 115.76 117.79
Manufacturer's proﬁt (ΠM) 29,216.27 29,317.40 29,417.97
Retailer's proﬁt (ΠR) 41,017.47 41,116.09 41,214.16
Collector's proﬁt (ΠC) 26.60 118.02 211.22
Total system's proﬁt (ΠT) 70,260.34 70,551.50 70,843.35
Table 4
Eﬀects of changes to the variance of the random yield.
γ∼U[A, B]
U[0,1] U[0.1,0.9] U[0.2,0.8]
Variance 0.08 0.05 0.03
Coeﬃcient of Variance (CV) 0.58 0.46 0.35
Wholesale price of new product (Pnw) 166.06 165.55 164.62
Retail price of new product (Pn) 274.34 274.10 273.68
Quantity of new product (qn) 314.80 316.96 320.87
Wholesale price of remanufactured product
(Prw)
149.45 148.99 148.16
Retail price of remanufactured product (Pr) 224.08 223.88 223.53
Quantity of remanufactured product (qr) 47.03 61.85 81.24
Acquisition price of used product (Pc) 5.03 5.53 6.25
Quantity of used product collected (qc) 97.49 104.90 115.76
Manufacturer's proﬁt (ΠM) 26,542.36 27,546.26 29,317.40
Retailer's proﬁt (ΠR) 37,594.91 39,039.05 41,116.09
Collector's proﬁt (ΠC) 595.13 556.03 118.02
Total system's proﬁt (ΠT) 64,732.40 67,141.35 70,551.50
Table 5
Eﬀects of changes to the transfer price.
Pf
50 40 30 20
Wholesale price of new product
(Pnw)
166.70 166.06 165.83 166.48
Retail price of new product (Pn) 274.62 274.34 274.23 274.53
Quantity of new product (qn) 312.14 314.80 315.75 313.04
Wholesale price of
remanufactured product
(Prw)
150.03 149.45 149.25 149.83
Retail price of remanufactured
product (Pr)
224.32 224.08 223.99 224.24
Quantity of remanufactured
product (qr)
48.68 47.03 44.10 38.58
Acquisition price of used
product (Pc)
5.54 5.03 4.41 3.63
Quantity of used product
collected (qc)
103.49 97.49 89.25 77.19
Manufacturer's proﬁt (ΠM) 26,354.07 26,542.36 26,550.04 26,177.42
Retailer's proﬁt (ΠR) 37,306.11 37,594.91 37,523.30 36,693.36
Collector's proﬁt (ΠC) 933.01 595.13 282.17 18.85
Total system's proﬁt (ΠT) 64,593.19 64,732.40 64,355.52 62,889.63
Table 6
Eﬀects of changes to the collector's shortage penalty.
nc
7 6 5 4
Wholesale price of new product
(Pnw)
165.92 165.99 166.06 166.13
Retail price of new product (Pn) 274.27 274.30 274.34 274.37
Quantity of new product (qn) 315.37 315.09 314.80 314.50
Wholesale price of
remanufactured product
(Prw)
149.33 149.39 149.45 149.52
Retail price of remanufactured
product (Pr)
224.03 224.05 224.08 224.11
Quantity of remanufactured
product (qr)
47.63 47.33 47.03 46.72
Acquisition price of used
product (Pc)
5.14 5.08 5.03 4.97
Quantity of used product
collected (qc)
99.22 98.36 97.49 96.61
Manufacturer's proﬁt (ΠM) 26,610.78 26,577.14 26,542.36 26,506.38
Retailer's proﬁt (ΠR) 37,728.30 37,662.71 37,594.91 37,524.74
Collector's proﬁt (ΠC) 568.14 581.75 595.13 608.26
Total system's proﬁt (ΠT) 64,907.23 64,821.60 64,732.40 64,639.39
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proﬁts decrease. In this setting, the manufacturer reacts by simulta-
neously increasing the wholesale price of the remanufactured product
(enough to cover the risk of it receiving shortage penalties) and de-
creasing the produced quantity of the remanufactured product. Al-
though all parties are hurt by the lowered proﬁts, the retailer's proﬁt
decreases faster than the manufacturer's and collector's (see Fig. 8). The
eﬀect of increasing shortage penalty is more signiﬁcant than the eﬀect
of increasing remanufacturing cost, in terms of lowering the proﬁts. The
collector reacts by adjusting the quantities of collected returns, and the
manufacturer also responds by producing fewer remanufactured pro-
ducts.
The shift in the mean value of the random yield inﬂuences the
proﬁts received by all three parties in a positive direction, as presented
in Table 3. As the expected value of the random yield increases, a larger
portion of the collected used products will meet the remanufacturing
requirements. Hence, the probability of supplying less than the order
quantity decreases, and the total quantity of the remanufactured pro-
duct increases. Furthermore, the collection price also increases to es-
calate the collection quantity as a response to the higher order quan-
tities of the remanufactured product. All of the members’ proﬁts
increase as the expected value of the random yield increases, as a result
of increased order fulﬁllment and reduced or fewer penalties, as seen in
Fig. 9. Consequently, the collector's percentage proﬁt increase is sig-
niﬁcantly higher than those of the others because the recovery yield of
product returns is isolated to the collector's inspection and sorting
process.
A similar argument applies for the variance of the random yield, as
shown in Table 4. An increase in the variance of the random yield is
responded to by increasing the remanufactured wholesale price to cover
the risk of unused returns, and this action decreases the remanufactured
product's quantity signiﬁcantly, which further hurts the manufacturer's
and retailer's proﬁts. It is interesting to note that the collector reacts by
a lowering of collection price, hence decreasing the collected returns.
Since the collector's expenses depends on collection price, her proﬁt
increases quite signiﬁcantly, as shown in Fig. 10. The eﬀect of the
changes in the prices according to the increase in the variance of the
random yield is more notable than that of changes to the mean value.
We ﬁnd that the wholesale and retail prices are more robust against a
shift in the mean value of the random yield rather than against a change
to the random yield's variance.
The eﬀects of the remanufacturing cost and the shortage penalty are
consistent with Li et al. [23], who demonstrated that an increase in the
parameters of the remanufacturing cost and the shortage penalty de-
creases the optimal quantity of the remanufactured product, reduces
the manufacturer's proﬁt, and increases the wholesale price of the re-
manufactured product. However, in [23], the eﬀect of the shortage
penalty on the remanufacturing quantity is not conclusive, and, such a
situation does not occur in our model. In addition to the above results,
by analyzing the whole supply chain, we ﬁnd that the retailer's and
collector's proﬁts are also aﬀected by changes to the remanufacturing
cost, in terms of the extended eﬀects of the change in remanufacturing
quantity.
In collector's optimization problem, there are parameters that are
signiﬁcant to her pricing decision, namely transfer price, collector's
shortage penalty, and salvage value. The eﬀects of those parameters can
be seen in Tables 5, 6, and 7, respectively. There is a conﬂict of interest
between the collector and the manufacturer with respect to the transfer
price. As manufacturer prefers lower transfer price, collector would
pursue higher transfer price. Table 5 and Fig. 11 show that the highest
total proﬁt is attained when transfer price is 40. However, when the
transfer price is getting too low, 20 for this case, even manufacturer's
proﬁt is decreasing. It can be explained by collector's response to de-
crease the collecting price and it would lower the quantity of collected
cores, and further would decrease the number of remanufactured pro-
duct, regardless the demand.
The collector's shortage penalty has become a driver for the
Table 7
Eﬀects of changes to the salvage value.
v
9 8 7 6
Wholesale price of new product
(Pnw)
166.05 166.06 166.07 166.07
Retail price of new product (Pn) 274.33 274.34 274.34 274.34
Quantity of new product (qn) 314.83 314.80 314.77 314.75
Wholesale price of
remanufactured product
(Prw)
149.45 149.45 149.46 149.47
Retail price of remanufactured
product (Pr)
224.08 224.08 224.08 224.09
Quantity of remanufactured
product (qr)
47.17 47.03 46.90 46.77
Acquisition price of used
product (Pc)
5.06 5.03 5.00 4.97
Quantity of used product
collected (qc)
97.91 97.49 97.09 96.71
Manufacturer's proﬁt (ΠM) 26,560.86 26,542.36 26,524.41 26,506.98
Retailer's proﬁt (ΠR) 37,609.44 37,594.91 37,580.83 37,567.21
Collector's proﬁt (ΠC) 607.00 595.13 583.34 571.62
Total system's proﬁt (ΠT) 64,777.29 64,732.40 64,688.58 64,645.81
Fig. 4. The retailer's proﬁt function.
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collector to provide suﬃcient cores. As shown in Table 6, the higher the
penalty, the higher the collector eﬀort which is reﬂected by higher
collection price. However, the collector's proﬁt is decreasing. Therefore,
it would not be eﬀective if the manufacturer sets up a high penalty as it
would push the collector to withdraw from the business. On the other
hand, when the salvage price of product returns is higher, it would
beneﬁt the collector as shown in Table 7. The collector is conﬁdent
enough to set a higher price for collection to increase the quantity of
returns, regardless the yield. These eﬀects can be seen in Fig. 12.
The price elasticity of the remanufactured product also has a con-
sistent eﬀect, as previously demonstrated in Li's work [21,23], which
showed that an increase in the price elasticity of the remanufactured
product signiﬁcantly decreases the optimal remanufacturing quantity,
the wholesale price, the selling price, and the used product collection
price, which, in turn, decreases the total proﬁts of the supply chain.
Table 8 shows these results. However, we observed that the eﬀect of an
increase in the price elasticity of the remanufactured product on the
collector's proﬁt is not conclusive because the collector’ proﬁt is sig-
niﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the transfer price. The determination of the
transfer price should be a coordinated decision, not one that is decided
by one party and then imposed upon the other, as the calculated values
of the optimum transfer price for the manufacturer and the collector
conﬂict. When the problem is addressed only from the point-of-view of
the manufacturer's problem, the conﬂict between the optimum transfer
price values for the manufacturer and the collector may not be ob-
served. Moreover, the eﬀect of the remanufactured product's elasticity
in relation to the new product's pricing can be studied under this model.
For example, an increase in the price elasticity of the remanufactured
product decreases the new product's wholesale and retail prices, even
though the decrease is less signiﬁcant to those of remanufactured pro-
duct.
The development of a pricing model that involves three members of
a closed-loop supply chain shows a consistent results compared to Li
et al. [21] from the manufacturer's point of view. Although Li et al. [21]
ﬁnd that recovery yield randomness does not inﬂuence the manufac-
turer's expected proﬁt, Li et al. [23] show that an increase in the re-
covery yield's variance can lead to an increase in the price of the re-
manufactured product, which then decreases the expected quantity and
the manufacturer's proﬁt. Interestingly, we show that by involving all of
the supply chain members in the pricing decisions, the eﬀect of re-
covery yield randomness can be mitigated from the increase in the
collector's proﬁt.
Fig. 5. The collector's proﬁt function.
Fig. 6. The manufacturer's proﬁt function.
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6. Concluding remarks
The pricing decision problem facing a closed-loop supply chain that
includes remanufacturing processes under conditions of random yield
and random demand is an important problem for which an acceptable
solution needs to be determined because this problem signiﬁcantly
aﬀects the proﬁtability of all of the members of the supply chain. Unlike
many previous studies, which generally only consider one member of
the supply chain, we developed a model that involves three key
members—a manufacturer, a retailer, and a collector—of a supply
chain that produces, sells, collects returns, remanufactures, and resells a
short life cycle product.
Fig. 7. The eﬀect of changes to the remanufacturing cost on the supply chain's proﬁt.
Fig. 8. The eﬀect of changes to the short-age penalty on the supply chain's proﬁt.
Fig. 9. The eﬀect of changes to the yield's randomness on the wholesale price.
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The results suggest that the decisions made by each party in the
closed-loop supply chain are aﬀected by a number of factors, including
the quality of the random yield, the remanufacturing costs, and the
penalties imposed for not meeting the quantity of used products needed
for remanufacturing. Subsequently the change in the decision variables
will aﬀect the proﬁtability of each player as well as the total proﬁt for
the supply chain as a whole. The quality of the random yield in this
paper is measured by the mean value of the yield and its variance. A
higher yield value means higher percentage of the collected used pro-
ducts that are manufacturable. The results show that higher yield
triggers the manufacturer and the retailer to reduce the prices, increase
remanufacturing activity and in the end these improve their proﬁt-
ability. An important implication of this result is that, creating a system
with better random yield quality is important for the society, i.e., good
for those who buy the products and also proﬁtable for those companies
working in the supply chain.
When the variance of random yield decreases, total supply chain
proﬁt improves. This is sensible as it is generally well perceived that
improving consistency is positive for the performance. However, when
the optimization is done concurrently among diﬀerent players, not all
players enjoy better proﬁtability. As we presented in the results above,
reducing variance of random yield results in lower proﬁt for the col-
lector even though the other players and the whole supply chain are
better oﬀ. This is an interesting observation and suggesting that any
collaboration to achieve higher total proﬁt for the whole system may
leave one player in a disadvantage situation. This raised an issue of the
importance of beneﬁt sharing mechanism that supports more equitable
wealth distribution among the supply chain members, a topic that is
critically important for the supply chain research.
The introduction of shortage penalty in our paper is an attempt to
entice the collector to get suﬃcient yields. The availability of re-
coverable returns is critical to the sustainability of the remanufacturing
activity, otherwise the remanufacturing capacity maybe underutilized
and the motives of promoting remanufacturing for environmental sus-
tainability may not be attained. Whereas previous studies found the
eﬀect of the shortage penalty on the remanufacturing quantity to be
inconclusive, we ﬁnd that an increase in the shortage penalty is re-
sponded to by a decrease in the remanufacturing quantity and a re-
duction in the proﬁts of the manufacturer and the retailer. Our ﬁnding
does not seem to support our initial objective, as the introduction of
shortage penalty is responded by the manufacturer by increasing
wholesale price and reducing remanufacturing activity. Future studies
should investigate other mechanism for enticing collectors to obtain
more recoverable returns and the other players to increase re-
manufacturing activity. One possibility is to introduce government
subsidy, an interesting scenario that future research on re-
manufacturing should address. Also, coordinated decisions accom-
panied by information sharing among the supply chain members could
Fig. 10. The eﬀect of changes to the yield's variance on the supply chain's proﬁt.
Fig. 11. The eﬀect of changes to transfer price
penalty on the supply chain's proﬁt.
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improve the supply chain's performance in making pricing decisions
that maximize proﬁts for all of the supply chain members. This model
could be extended to include coordinated decisions, which would be an
important future research agenda.
Finally, in this study we have used the uniform distribution to
capture the uncertainty in the random yields. The shortcomings of the
uniform distribution is that it may not represent appropriately the
characteristics of the random yields. Exploring other probability dis-
tribution for the yields is an important direction for future study.
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Proof. of Proposition 1
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Fig. 12. The eﬀect of changes to shortage and salvage value to collector's proﬁt.
Table 8
Eﬀects of changes to the price elasticity of the remanufactured product.
c
0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006
Wholesale price of new product
(Pnw)
169.93 166.06 162.80 163.14
Retail price of new product (Pn) 277.84 274.34 271.88 271.38
Quantity of new product (qn) 301.68 314.80 326.17 322.02
Wholesale price of
remanufactured product
(Prw)
152.94 149.45 140.91 123.48
Retail price of remanufactured
product (Pr)
277.16 224.08 188.75 159.91
Quantity of remanufactured
product (qr)
69.23 47.03 29.12 23.42
Acquisition price of used
product (Pc)
8.90 5.03 2.88 2.34
Quantity of used product
collected (qc)
139.36 97.49 68.39 58.43
Manufacturer's proﬁt (ΠM) 26,477.46 26,542.36 25,455.42 24,589.99
Retailer's proﬁt (ΠR) 41,152.60 37,594.91 36,970.13 35,709.04
Collector's proﬁt (ΠC) 338.61 595.13 505.56 438.84
Total system's proﬁt (ΠT) 67,968.67 64,732.40 62,931.11 60,737.87
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Proof of Proposition 2
Substituting q*Rn and q*Rr in (4.1), the optimization problem becomes:
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Proof of Proposition 3
Let =z qqrc , which represents the value of γ when =q γ qc r ; thus, replacing Pc with ( )qφq θ1/cn according to the collection function (4.17), the
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Applying the ﬁrst derivative condition, we ﬁnd:
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As =q zqr c and = −dzdq qqc rc2 , the equation becomes (4.13) [qed].
Proof of Proposition 4For α∼U[A1, B1]⊂[0, 1] and β∼U[A2, B2]⊂[0, 1]
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Now we ﬁnd optimal prices by solving (4.1)
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[qed].
Proof of Proposition 5
For γ∼U[A3, B3]⊂[0, 1]
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replacing qn and qr with (A.11) and (A.12) will yields (4.19) [qed].
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Proof of Proposition 6
For α∼U[A1, B1]⊂[0, 1], β∼U[A2, B2]⊂[0, 1], and For γ∼U[A3, B3]⊂[0, 1], also incorporating (A.11) and (A.12), the manufacturer's
optimization problem (4.14) becomes
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which is expressed as (4.20) [qed].
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